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Changes in social security eligibility and the international 
mobility of New Zealand citizens in Australia* 
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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with the international mobility of New Zealanders who 
migrate to Australia. One in ten New Zealand citizens lives in Australia and their 
settlement and subsequent mobility is important from demographic, socio-economic 
and policy perspectives in both countries. Using a unique longitudinal dataset on New 
Zealand citizens arriving for a stay of 12 months or longer between 1 August 1999 
and 31 July 2002, we track all subsequent moves of these migrants out of and back 
into Australia, up to July 2005. This allows us to assess the impact of the removal of 
labour market-related social security eligibility and some other policy changes 
affecting New Zealand migrants to Australia, implemented between February and 
June 2001. United Kingdom migrants to Australia, who were not affected by the 
policy changes, provide a ‘control group’.   
 Using hazard models, we find that the policy changes increased the probability 
of remigration from Australia among those who had intended to settle permanently. 
Competing risk models suggested no difference between the impact of the policy 
changes on onward or return moves. Settlers arriving after the policy changes spend 
less time Australia and make more trips away than earlier migrants.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The total number of international migrants in the world more than doubled since 1960 
to almost 191 million in 2005, including 13.5 million refugees (United Nations, 2006). 
For many of these migrants there were significant administrative barriers prior to 
settlement in a host country, as governments try to control inward migration in order 
to avoid a potential avalanche of workers from low income countries. Sometimes, 
however, international movement is not subject to restrictions. A particularly good 
example, the focus of this paper, is the migration of citizens of Australia and New 
Zealand between their respective countries. Under the Trans-Tasman Travel 
Agreement (TTTA – referring to the Tasman Sea, which lies between the two 
countries), officially introduced in 1973 but effectively in force since the 1920s, 
citizens of Australia and New Zealand may freely live and work in each other’s 
country. 
The TTTA is effectively an open entry immigration policy. Until 2000 New 
Zealanders in Australia and Australians in New Zealand had the same rights as other 
non-citizen permanent residents. This changed in 2001, when new policies were 
introduced unilaterally by Australia that removed some of the rights of New 
Zealanders migrating across the Tasman subsequently. Specifically, New Zealanders 
can now no longer obtain Australian citizenship, nor are they eligible for social 
security while unemployed, unless they successfully apply for permanent residence, 
under the same immigration criteria in place for immigrants from other countries. The 
next section of the paper reviews the history of trans-Tasman migration and the 
background to these policy changes. 
In this paper, we estimate the effect of these policy changes on the 
international mobility behaviour of New Zealanders by means of a unique 
longitudinal dataset provided by the former Australian Department of Immigration, 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) that spans a period of both the old and 
the new policy regimes. The dataset contains all New Zealand citizens arriving for a 
stay of 12 months or longer between 1 August 1999 and 31 July 2002. We track all 
subsequent moves of these migrants out of and back into Australia, up to July 2005. 
United Kingdom migrants to Australia, who were not affected by the policy changes, 
provide a ‘control group’. 
Section 3 provides a theoretical framework that is particularly suitable for 
studying contemporary international mobility and the impact of the policy changes at 
the micro level. While traditionally international migration was seen as a one-off 
event over the life course, return and repeat migration are increasingly common 
phenomena. In addition, migrants may make various international trips for work, 
vacation, family visits, etc. With declining real costs of international travel and 
communication, short-term mobility is increasing.  
However, we will argue that short-run mobility decisions are not taken 
independently of migration decisions. We therefore formulate a model of migration 
(the choice of a country to work and reside in), attachment (the proportion of time 
actually spent in the country of residence) and travel (the number of international 
trips). We measure, and model, these dimensions of mobility for New Zealand and 
UK immigrants to Australia in Sections 4 and 5 respectively.  
Section 4 describes and summarises the longitudinal data provided by DIMIA. 
Section 5 discusses estimates of semi-parametric hazard functions of return or onward 
migration among NZ and UK immigrants to Australia. Attachment and travel abroad 
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are also modelled. Attachment is analysed by means of standard regression models 
and models for count data are applied to the number of trips away. 
We find that the policy changes increased the probability of departure from 
Australia among those who had intended to settle permanently. However, competing 
risk models suggested no difference between the impact of the policy changes on 
onward or return moves. Migrants arriving after the policy changes have a higher 
absence rate from Australia, and make more trips away.  
The paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. Firstly, while 
there are already various macro-level econometric studies of trans-Tasman migration 
(Brosnan and Poot, 1987b; Poot, 1993; Poot, 1995; Gorbey et al., 1999), this is the 
first study that adopts a longitudinal micro perspective. Secondly, the paper introduces 
a multidimensional approach to international mobility consisting of migration, 
attachment and travel. Thirdly, the three dimensions of mobility are integrated into 
one dynamic behavioural theory that defines optimal joint paths of locational choice, 
attachment and travel. Fourthly, we find that the hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical framework with respect to the impact of the policy changes are generally 
confirmed with the longitudinal data.  
Section 6 provides some final comments and suggestions for further research. 
 
 
2. Trans-Tasman migration 
 
Migration between Australia and New Zealand has a long history, going back to 19th 
century colonial days. Detailed reviews of the demographic trends and their contexts 
can be found in Pool (1980) and Carmichael (1993). Historically, the net flow tended 
to be towards New Zealand and although New Zealand did not join the Australian 
Federation in 1901, significant historical, political, cultural and economic similarities 
were instrumental in the introduction of free movement of citizens between the two 
since the 1920s. In 1901 there were 25,788 New Zealand-born migrants in Australia 
and 26,991 Australia-born migrants in New Zealand.  
Until the Depression the Australians in New Zealand continued to exceed the 
New Zealanders in Australia. By 1933 the balance had reversed but even in 1976, 
when there were 89,791 New Zealand-born in Australia, the number of Australia-born 
in New Zealand was still two-thirds of that (Brosnan and Poot, 1987a).  Since then the 
flows of migrants between the two countries have grown rapidly, and fluctuated 
widely, but net migration has been persistently in the direction of Australia. 
The reasons are complex and varied, but lower long-run economic growth in 
New Zealand vis-à-vis Australia, compounded by the consequences of radical 
economic reforms between the mid 1980s and mid 1990s in New Zealand (with more 
moderate reforms in Australia), played a major role. The declining real cost of air 
travel and large post-war baby boom cohorts seeking overseas experience were also 
major factors. ‘Ripple’ effects of return migration, following initial migration waves 
contributed to the volatility in the flows (e.g, Poot 1993b; Gorbey et al., 1999). Figure 
1 displays annual Permanent and Long-Term Trans-Tasman migration flows 1948-
2005.  
It is clear from Figure 1 that since the mid 1970s migration from New Zealand to 
Australia is at higher levels and significantly more volatile than migration from 
Australia to New Zealand. Since trans-Tasman migration accounts for more than half 
of New Zealand’s overall international migration, trans-Tasman migration has had a 
major impact on the growth rate of the New Zealand population (e.g., Poot 1993a).  
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Fig. 1: Trans-Tasman Permanent and Long-Term Migration Flows, Year Ending 31 
March, 1948-2005 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
 
At the time of the 2001 Census, the New Zealand-born population in Australia was 
355,765 and is expected to have increased by another 100,000 by the time of the June 
2006 Census. The Australia-born population in New Zealand was 56,259 persons in 
2001 and increased to 62,742 in 2006. 3  Given that the flows are not subject to 
administrative controls, the net migration from New Zealand to Australia may be 
interpreted as intra-country regional labour market adjustment in response to 
significant growth differentials (Poot, 1995), with New Zealand only a middling 
performer compared with fast growing Australian States such as Queensland and 
Western Australia (Grimes 2005).  
The imbalance in the flows led the Australian government in the late 1990s to 
revisit the TTTA, as Australia perceived the situation to be one of a very unequal 
fiscal burden associated with the New Zealanders in Australia as compared with their 
counterparts in New Zealand.4 New Zealand made no financial contribution to labour 
market-linked welfare payments to New Zealand citizens in Australia, while New 
Zealand contributions to state pensions paid to their citizens in Australia were 
considered to be far too little.  
Another Australian reason for concern with the unbalanced migration flows was that a 
growing proportion of the flow from New Zealand to Australia in the 1990s consisted 
                                                 
3 Many of these are Australia-born children of New Zealand citizens. Only 26,355 usual residents of 
New Zealand wrote “Australia” as an ethnic group they belong to (multiple ethnicity responses were 
permitted).  Many Australia-born persons living in New Zealand may have stated to be “New Zealand 
European”.  
4 It has been shown that Australia receives in fact a net fiscal benefit from the presence of New Zealand 
migrants and that this benefit is greater than for other migrant groups (NZIER, 2000).  
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of immigrants to New Zealand, who moved on to Australia after obtaining New 
Zealand citizenship. This form of ‘backdoor entry’ into Australia was perceived by 
the Australian Government as diminishing its ability to control settler entry into that 
country. 
Pressures to terminate the TTTA were successfully resisted, as doing so would 
have been inconsistent with a trend towards greater economic integration between the 
two countries, formalised under the 1983 Closer Economic Relations (CER) 
agreement, and subsequent liberalisation of trade and capital mobility (see, e.g., 
Grimes et al., 2000). However, on February 26 2001, a policy change was announced 
that aimed to overcome the problems noted above. From June 2001, New Zealand 
citizens migrating to Australia were no longer eligible for labour market-related social 
welfare payments (primarily the unemployment benefit) regardless of the length of 
time they had been living in Australia. Instead, New Zealand citizens must now 
successfully apply for permanent residence in Australia, subject to the same 
conditions as migrants from other source countries, in order to be eligible for such 
social welfare payments. 
Alongside access to social welfare benefits, New Zealanders also lost their 
eligibility to apply for Australian citizenship and to sponsor family members to join 
them in Australia, without having first gained permanent residence. These changes 
brought New Zealanders' access to social support and the privileges of citizenship 
more in line with migrants from other source countries, while retaining their right to 
live and work freely in Australia as agreed under the TTTA. New Zealanders also 
retain access to non-labour market based benefits, including a range of family 
allowances and tax credits, rent assistance, and Medicare, as well as public housing 
and education services. In effect, the policy changes remove the safety net of social 
welfare in the case of loss of labour income, while maintaining access to social 
services. Migration statistics suggest that the policy changes led to smaller post-
announcement flows, at least initially, while the proportion of ‘backdoor’ migrants 
among the NZ citizens dropped as well (Bedford et al., 2003). These observations are 
reconfirmed with our micro-level dataset in Section 3. 
In this paper we measure the impact of the policy changes by observing 
differences in the international mobility behaviour between New Zealanders arriving 
before the policy changes were announced, as compared with those who arrived 
subsequently. As noted in the introduction, to control for other factors that may 
impact on mobility behaviour over time we use a sample of United Kingdom citizens 
who migrated to Australia at the same time as a ‘control group’.  
The econometric analysis is applied to a unique dataset of 112,454 NZ citizens 
and 108,734 UK citizens who stated an intention of remaining in Australia for at least 
12 months upon first entry between 1 August 1999 and 31 July 2002. Their 
subsequent movements out of, and back into, Australia have been recorded until 30 
June 2005. As noted in the introduction, we consider three dimensions of international 
mobility: the likelihood of remigration, the percentage of time actually spent in the 
host country, and the frequency of travel. Before summarising the data in Section 3, 
we first provide in the next section a theoretical framework that combines these 
dimensions of international mobility. 
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3. An economic theory of migration, attachment and travel 
 
One issue that is remarkably neglected in the international migration literature, yet is 
of growing importance given the growth in international travel, is the pattern of 
international mobility that follows an initial decision to migrate. With longitudinal 
data at our disposal on the mobility of NZ and UK migrants to Australia, the 
subsequent international mobility of these migrants following their arrival in Australia 
is central to our analysis. This mobility includes both short-term movement and long-
term migration, for example back to the home country, onward to a third country, or 
involving several additional long spells in the host country interspersed with long 
spells at home. 
Traditionally, the move to a foreign land was seen as a once in a lifetime 
decision, but increasingly migrants continue to nurture links with the home country, 
or develop links with third countries, not just to maintain personal or business 
contacts, but also as a rational strategy to prepare for return or onward migration. The 
incidence and determinants of return and repeat migration have already been 
addressed quite extensively in the internal migration literature (e.g., DaVanzo, 1983; 
Kau and Sirmans, 1976), but have in recent years also attracted growing attention in 
the international migration literature (Constant and Zimmermann, 2003; Dustmann, 
2003; Bijwaard, 2005); However, what is often neglected in this literature is the 
importance of the linkages between short-term and long-term movement.  
Potential international migrants have several choices to make. They choose a 
path of locations that may involve one or several spells of work abroad (referred to as 
migration in what follows), but while abroad they must decide on the amount of time 
they wish to actually be in the host country (referred to as attachment) and the 
frequency of trips back home or elsewhere (referred to as travel).  
The innovation of the proposed theory is that the three phenomena of 
migration, attachment and travel are considered interlinked. For example, when the 
cost of international travel is high or visas are hard to obtain, the incentive to migrate 
may be low but once migration has taken place the optimal attachment to the host 
country is likely to be high and international mobility relatively low. Consequently, a 
lowering of the effective cost of international movement (e.g. by greater flight 
frequencies or lower airfares) may lead to a greater desire to migrate, but may also 
lower attachment to the host country and increase mobility. The remainder of this 
section formalises these ideas by means of an integrated dynamic cost-benefit model 
of migration, attachment and travel. In line with an emphasis on economic 
considerations, the focus is here solely on the migration of people for work-related 
reasons. 
To simplify matters, but without loss of the essence of the international 
residential mobility process, consider two countries: home H and abroad A. Migration 
is defined, as is common in actual migration statistics, by intended or actual 
residential relocation for a period of twelve months or more. Consequently, the unit of 
time is a year. Workers may move between countries within the year, but such short-
term mobility does not affect their residence status, which – as is conventional in tax 
laws – is defined by the country from which they obtain a wage. During a given initial 
year, t = 0, a worker decides a sequence of residences (home H or abroad A) for years 
t = 1, 2, …, N, with N the expected remaining years of work until retirement.5 The 
                                                 
5 Issues of “tied movers” and “tied stayers” in household migration are not considered here, as the 
available data refer to individuals only. 
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sequence of residences is a vector l = (l0, l1, l2,…, lN), with lt = 0 if the worker is 
employed in H and lt = 1 if the worker is employed in A.  By assumption l0 = 0.  
In each year t, workers gain utility from consumption activities Ct; from 
amenities available at a given location (e.g. climate, public facilities) Qt; and from the 
strength of ties with family and friends Pt. The latter are initially assumed to be 
mostly, but not entirely, located in H. By spending time in A, the worker accumulates 
additional utility-yielding personal relationships there as well. All (state) variables 
measuring outcomes in year t = 1, 2, …, N are interpreted as expected values, given 
the information available in year 0. 
However, in line with the growing prevalence of trans-national location 
observed in many countries, the worker has additionally a choice to decide what 
proportion of the year to allocate to actually being in A, while being in H for the 
remainder of the year. As noted earlier we refer to this as attachment. This is here 
defined with respect to A, so that attachment at is the proportion of the year t that the 
worker actually spends in A. Wage income is only obtained when the worker is 
actually in the country of residence, so time spent in H would be costly for a worker 
who decides to work in A and vice versa. By assumption a0 = 0. 
Having decided what proportion of time to allocate to H and A, the third and 
final decision which the worker must make is that of the frequency of trips between 
the two countries, referred to above as travel. The variable mt measures the number of 
return trips between H and A, following the initial decision of where to work in year t. 
If at = 0 or at = 1, then mt = 0. But as long as at ∈ (0,1), mt = 1, 2, 3,… In that case, 
given at and mt, the average duration of a spell in H is the fraction tt ma )1( − of a year 
while spells in A are of duration tt ma . Because a0 = 0,  m0 = 0. 
Individuals are assumed to experience diminishing marginal utility not just 
with respect to consumption goods but also with respect to the amount of time spent 
in a given country. Consequently, it is assumed that a migrant living in country A 
gains greater utility from a number of short sojourns to H than from one extended trip 
of equal aggregate duration, and similarly for migrants living mainly in country H and 
visiting A.   
The worker now chooses three vectors l, a and m to maximise the following 
objective function 
 
N
NN
N
t
t
ttt WWPQCUV
)1(
)(
)1(
),,( 2*
1 ρ
ϑ
ρ +
−++= ∑= , (1) 
 
in which U refers to the utility function, ρ refers to the person’s internal rate of 
time preference (which may also reflect risk aversion), Ct is the real value of the 
worker’s consumption measured in H’s currency, Qt is an index of the stock of 
amenities enjoyed globally and Pt is an index of the global stock of personal 
relationships. In addition, the objective function includes a ‘penalty’ component for 
the deviation of endpoint wealth NW from a desired level of endpoint wealth 
*
NW . The 
utility function is assumed to have the usual properties and for simplicity takes the 
form: 
 
321),,( ααα tttttt PQCPQCU =  (2) 
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with 1;0 321 <++> αααα i . By spending time in A and H, the volume of 
amenities enjoyed in year t is simply the combination of at AtQ  and (1−at) HtQ  
respectively, whereby AtQ  and 
H
tQ  are the exogenous levels of amenities in A and H 
at time t respectively. Enjoyment of the amenities is also a function of the number of 
times they are experienced per year. Because of assumed diminishing marginal utility 
of amenities for an increasing spell length at a particular location, more aggregate 
enjoyment is gained from several shorter trips for a given fraction of time per year 
spent at a location. It is easy to see that total utility, for given at, converges to a limit 
for ∞→tm . This suggests the following specification for the Qt , the index of the 
stock of amenities enjoyed globally: 
 ( )[ ] [ ] 21 )1(10 βββ HttAttmt QaQaeQ t −−= −  (3) 
 
with 1;0 21 <+> βββ i ; ( ) 10 ββ Att QQ =  when at = 1; and ( ) 20 ββ Htt QQ =  
when at = 0 (in both cases mt = 0 also). 
The strength of ties with family and friends in year t is a function of the stocks 
of relationships built up in both H and A, and the number of visits made to nurture 
these relationships. It is assumed that stocks of relationships in a location build up 
linearly with the amount of time spent in that location. The number of new friends and 
acquaintances made per year is πH in H, and πA in A. Hence 
 
)1()1( 11 −− −+−= tHHtHt aPP πη  (4) 
11)1( −− +−= tAAtAt aPP πη  (5) 
 
for t = 1, 2, …, N ; HP0  and 
AP0  are the given initial stocks of relationships in 
H and A respectively and η is the rate of depreciation of this social capital. Equations 
(4) and (5) take into account that the ease with which relationships build up can differ 
between H and A, as πA and πH need not be the same. If in year t the worker has not 
yet been in A (and recall a0 = 0), then obviously AAt PP 0= . The ‘volume’ of benefits 
from the global network of relationships is, similarly to amenities, a function of the 
combination of at AtP  and (1−at) HtP  whereby AtP   and HtP  are now the endogenous 
stocks of relationships in A and H in year t respectively. The volume of personal 
interaction is also positively related to the number of trips between the countries, but  
with the limit again determined by instantaneous marginal utility upon arrival at a 
location:  
 ( )[ ] [ ] 21 )1(10 γγγ HttAttmt PaPaeP t −−= −  (3) 
 
with 1;0 21 <+> γγγ i ; ( ) 10 γγ Att PP =  when at = 1; and ( ) 20 γβ Htt PP =  when 
at = 0 (again coinciding with mt = 0). 
Consumption equals income minus savings minus the cost of migration 
whenever it occurs, and minus the cost of return trips between the two countries, i.e. 
 
tttttt
H
tt
A
tttt mllDSYlYlC τϕ −−−−−+= −1)1(  (7) 
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in which ϕt is the purchasing power parity exchange rate that converts foreign 
nominal income into comparable home consumption, AtY  and 
H
tY  are income 
obtainable in A and H respectively, St is financial saving, Dt is the cost of job 
migration from H to A or back (which only occurs when 1−≠ tt ll ; and is assumed to 
take place at the beginning of a year) and τt is the unit cost of a return trip between H 
and A. Consumption is spread evenly over the year, irrespective of location. The cost 
of migration Dt would include the transportation cost of the worker and family 
members, the removal of household belongings, job separation costs, etc. 
The worker possesses human capital from a given level of education 
(including initial experience) E0 that yields, through work, a rate of return Htδ  or Atδ . 
In addition, working in either H or A yields additional experience in these countries 
that is rewarded in that country but not in the other (i.e., on-the-job training is 
country-specific). The return to experience is proportional to the time worked, with 
H
tε  and Atε  being the rates of return.  
Both in H and A, income depends on the availability of work. The 
unemployment rate of home and abroad are given by Htu  and 
A
tu  respectively. When 
a person is unemployed, the government pays a social security benefit of HtB  and 
A
tB  
respectively. However, this benefit is only available when the person is actually in the 
country and when the person is eligible. Consequently, when working in A, expected 
income is 
 
A
tt
A
t
t
j
j
A
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A
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A
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while when working in H, 
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j
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H
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with t = 1, 2, …, N.. The worker accumulates financial wealth as follows: 
 
tt
H
tt
A
ttt SWililW +−++= −1))1(1(  (10) 
 
Initial financial wealth is exogenously given as W0, which may be negative 
(e.g. in the case of the worker having incurred debt in gaining human capital E0). 
Equation (10) allows for an effective after tax interest rate that depends on whether 
the worker resides and works in A or H. For example, a worker starting with negative 
financial wealth (a student loan) may have interest applied to the debt when in A, but 
not when in H (as is the case for New Zealanders). 
Equations (1) to (10) describe a fully specified discrete-time dynamic 
programming model of wealth accumulation with given initial and desired endpoint 
wealth. The problem is to select vectors l, a, m and S to maximise the objective 
function (1). For given expected values of amenities, benefits from interaction with 
family and friends, returns to human capital and experience, migration costs, travel 
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costs, unemployment rates and government policies (social security rates, taxes, etc), 
the optimal path could be calculated numerically by means of the principle of 
optimality (e.g. Dreyfus and Law, 1977, p. 100-102). For each value of the year index 
t, we can compute the maximum of the remaining contributions to the objective 
function (1) for both lt = 1 and lt = 0. The decision to re(migrate) is then simply 
determined by whether lt is the same as lt+1 or not.  
While numerically solvable, it is clear that the problem as formulated above is 
too complex for analytical solutions. However, for a given work location, the effects 
of wages and travel costs on optimal attachment and travel frequency can be obtained 
for a somewhat simplified sub-model (McCann et al., 2007). The optimal path 
evaluated at time 0 is denoted )Sm,a,(l *0
*
0
*
0
*
0, . 
Optimal paths could be never to leave H (i.e., *0l = [0, 0, …, 0]), to migrate to 
A and stay there (i.e., *0l  = [0, 1, 1,…, 1]), to migrate to A and eventually return to H 
(i.e., *0l  = [0, 1,…,1,0, …,0]), or more complex patterns. While working in one of the 
two countries, the optimal path is likely to involve nonetheless some time being spent 
in the other country (due to the benefits of amenities and personal interaction). The 
optimal number of trips between the countries can be shown to be inversely related to 
the cost of each trip, while the fraction of time spent visiting a country is in a steady-
state approximately a square root function of the trip frequency (McCann et al., 2007).  
Given the assumption of diminishing marginal utility with respect to 
consumption, amenities, relationships and frequency of travel, the first order 
conditions of the optimization problem will be in a steady state in the form of 
expressions for the marginal benefit of the optimal steady-state choice being equal to 
the marginal cost. More specifically, the steady-state optimal attachment to the host 
country is such that the marginal benefit of an additional day spent in A equals the 
value of marginal benefit of an additional day spent in H. This is shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 2. The marginal benefit gained from being in A, MBA, 
declines with the proportion of time spent in A, while the marginal benefit of time 
spent in H, MBH, increases when time spent in A increases.  
 
Fig 2: Optimal Attachment to Location A 
a*` 
MBA 
MBH
MBA’ 
1 0 a* 
MBH’
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As such, it is possible to determine an optimal allocation of time, a*, which 
maximizes total utility, given optimal residence, frequency of travel and savings. 
Similarly, the optimal number of trips is such that the marginal benefit of an 
additional trip (which will be implicitly also a function of the selected level of 
attachment, savings and the decision of where to work) is equal to the marginal cost τt. 
This is shown in Figure 3. The marginal cost of an additional trip is shown as an 
exogenous constant – the cost of flights, departure taxes and other associated costs are 
not dependent upon the number of trips made each year. Under the adopted 
assumptions, the marginal benefit of trip frequency MB is downward sloping. The 
optimal trip frequency is therefore equal to m*. 
 
Figure 3: Optimal Travel Frequency 
 
The optimal location path *0l  determined in year t = 0 is such that any other 
possible permutation of work/residence locations yields an expected present value of 
utility that is less or at most equally high, given the information set available at the 
time when the initial optimal path is evaluated. However, changes in either the 
information set available or in actual external conditions may cause migrants to re-
evaluate and alter their initial intentions. 
The optimal choices are updated annually. Hence, in year 1, the optimal path 
becomes )Sm,a,(l *** *1111 ,  and takes into account any new information. If external 
conditions do not change unexpectedly, workers will not deviate from their initially 
chosen optimal sequence of locations. However, if there are unexpected changes in 
conditions (such as an unexpected change in the unemployment rate in A or H), or if 
new information becomes available which alters the expected current and future 
utility paths, workers will adjust their plans of work location, attachment and travel 
accordingly. Any initially planned residence spell in A may then be curtailed or 
prolonged.  
This theory suggests that a migrant’s likelihood of return migration will 
change over time after better information is acquired (which may lead some to return 
already soon after arrival). Subsequently, on-the-job training and a growing stock of 
τ 
MB’ 
MC
m*’ m* 
MB 
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acquaintances leads to greater utility from staying longer. While migrants may have 
difficulty getting full information about employment and living conditions in the host 
country prior to arrival, it is likely that this knowledge will increase dramatically over 
a short time in the host country. In contrast, changes in the actual conditions in a 
country are likely to occur more gradually over time. As such, remigration decisions 
that are made within a short time after arrival are expected to be due to the acquisition 
of new information. Remigration in the longer term may be caused more by changes 
in actual conditions or may be part of a planned sequence of migratory moves. 
Planned return is unlikely to occur after short residence spells due to the fixed costs 
associated with migration itself.  
These considerations suggest that the likelihood of an onward or return 
migration is initially increasing with increasing duration of stay (as the number of 
revisions of initial migration plans will increase when more information is obtained), 
but at a later stage the propensity to remigrate may decline. The decline in subsequent 
mobility is also due to the fact that migrants gain greater experience and both social 
and economic connections in their current location. As the balance of personal and 
economic locational capital shifts towards the current location, migrants will face a 
lower incentive to remigrate. Known as ‘cumulative inertia’ or ‘(negative) duration 
dependence’ in the migration literature, this has often been confirmed in empirical 
studies (e.g. Greenwood, 1997). Put together, the information effect and the 
accumulation of location-fixed capital lead to an expectation of a concave-shaped 
hazard function. This is confirmed by the semi-parametric estimation of the hazard 
function in Section 5. 
We can now also predict the impact of a change in social security eligibility on 
migration, attachment and travel. The rules of eligibility of New Zealand citizens in 
Australia have gradually been tightened. Before 1986 migrants were eligible upon 
arrival. Between 1986 and 2000, a six month ‘stand down’ period was introduced, 
which was then extended to a 24 month period between February 2000 and February 
2001. Subsequently, automatic eligibility was revoked entirely. Effectively, this 
implies in the model above that AtB  = 0 for Tt ≥  with NT <<0 . 
From equation (8) it is clear that t
A
t aY ∂∂ /  is increasing in AtB . A reduction in 
the unemployment benefit in A reduces therefore the expected additional income from 
an additional day spent in A. This lowers the likelihood of migration from H to A 
(which we cannot observe with our data) but increases the likelihood of return 
migration (which we do observe, as will be shown in Section 5). 
Two opposing forces affect the impact of the benefit change on the allocation 
of time between the two countries. On the one hand, the decline in expected income 
raises the marginal benefit from an additional day working in A (this is essentially 
equivalent to the income effect on the demand for leisure when the expect wage 
declines in the standard labour supply model), but on the other it also increases the 
marginal benefit of spending an additional day in H (which is essentially equivalent to 
the substitution effect of the decline in the expected wage on the demand for leisure). 
These two effects lead to MBA and MBH both shifting upwards. The way these shifts 
have been drawn in Figure 2 yields a new optimal attachment to A, a*’, which is less 
than it was previously (equivalent to moving down an upward sloping labour supply 
curve). Moreover, the lower expect income in A raises the marginal benefit of an 
additional trip back to H, because of diminishing marginal utility of increasing spell 
lengths. Consequently, the MB curve in Figure 3 shifts upwards so that, for given 
marginal trip costs, more frequent travel may be expected. 
  12 
In Section 5 of this paper we apply this theory to the mobility behaviour of UK and 
New Zealand migrants to Australia. We measure and model the hazard rate of repeat 
or return migration following an intention to settle for 12 months or more in Australia. 
The attachment to Australia and the number of trips out of Australia are also 
considered. We then assess the extent to which these various measures of international 
mobility are affected by the policy changes introduced by the Australian Government 
in 2001. The empirical results reported in Section 5 show that the 2001 social security 
changes in Australia are an example of the case in which the optimal attachment 
declines as shown in Figure 2. Similarly, removal of the unemployment benefit for 
New Zealand workers in Australia indeed increased the frequency of trips back home 
as shown in Figure 3. However, first we describe and summarise the data in the next 
section. 
 
 
4. International mobility data 
 
Australian legislation requires all passengers who enter or leave Australia by airplane 
or ship to complete a passenger card. The cards include questions about current travel 
itineraries as well as personal characteristics such as age and occupation. 
When a non-Australian resident arrives stating an intention to remain in 
Australia for 12 months or more, they are classified as a Permanent or Long-Term 
(PLT) migrant. Passenger card details are recorded in full for all PLT arrivals and are 
then integrated with details available from the Travel and Immigration Processing 
System (TRIPS), which records travellers’ passport and visa information, including 
age, sex, and marital status.6 After new PLT arrivals have been captured in the system 
all their subsequent moves into and out of Australia are fully documented, regardless 
of the intended or actual duration of each trip. 
The full sample used in this paper includes all NZ and UK citizens whose first 
entry to Australia (after the current electronic recording system began in July 1998) 
occurred over the period from August 1999 to July 2002, and who stated an intention 
to remain in Australia for at least 12 months. The sample is split into three one-year 
cohorts of new arrivals. These cohorts broadly align with the different phases of 
Australia’s policy change with respect to New Zealand citizens. The first cohort, from 
August 1999 to July 2000, entered Australia under a system in which New Zealanders 
became eligible for social welfare assistance, could apply for Australian citizenship, 
and sponsor family members for permanent residence once they had been in the 
country for two years. The second cohort, from August 2000 to July 2001, covers 
those people who arrived over the period during which the policy change was being 
discussed, announced, and implemented. The final cohort, from August 2001 to July 
2002, covers only those people who arrived after the policy change had been fully 
implemented. Figure 4 below shows the timeline for data collection, and relates this to 
the changes in welfare policy.   
 
                                                 
6 Marital status is recorded on visa applications and is not available for New Zealand citizens, who are 
issued a Special Category Visa on arrival in Australia.  
  13 
 
Fig 4: Timeline of Data Collection, Policy Changes, and Selected Samples 
 
A reduced sample is used for the multivariate empirical analysis of Section 5. The 
sub-sample takes two two-month cohorts of arrivals – those who arrived in June and 
July of 2000, before the announcement of the policy change, and those who arrived in 
June or July of 2001, after the policy change was fully implemented. This sub-sample 
was chosen to maximize the duration of time over which the migrants could be 
observed (four years minimum), while minimizing the differences between the two 
sub-cohorts due to either seasonal differences or changes in the overall environment 
by taking two periods exactly one year apart. In order to focus on the determinants of 
remigration and mobility among labour force participants, the sub-sample is restricted 
to those migrants who stated an intention to remain permanently in Australia, and for 
whom a main occupation could be determined under the Australian Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ASCO). 
The full dataset covers a total of 221,188 people and 1,272,531 border 
crossings, either into or out of Australia. Among the 112,454 New Zealanders who 
migrated to Australia, 80,074 arrived as permanent settlers and 32,380 as temporary 
long-term residents. The total number of new arrivals from the UK was similar 
(108,734), but the composition very different, with 21,466 UK citizens arriving 
permanently and 87,268 as temporary migrants.  
While the total number of migrants from each source country was similar, 
there were noticeable differences in the distribution of arrivals over the three time 
periods. The inflow of UK citizens was relatively stable across the three year periods, 
with a small annual decline of around 1,000 people. In contrast, the number of New 
Zealanders arriving rose from 41,458 in the first cohort, to 45,553 in the second, 
before dropping to 25,443 in the final cohort (Figure 5). While it is tempting to 
attribute this variation solely to the change in Australia’s welfare policy with respect 
to new migrants from New Zealand, Bedford et al. (2003) show that 2000/01 was also 
a time of unusually high emigration from New Zealand to all destinations, not only to 
Australia. However, the dip in the total number of New Zealanders moving to 
Australia in the period after the implementation of the new policy may have be 
June/July 2001: 
Second sub-cohort 
for empirical 
modelling 
1 August, 1999 
 
October 2000 
Announcement of 
impending change 
in welfare policy 
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and subsequent movements recorded 
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partially self-correction, to a long-run level, after the large increase of the previous 
year. 
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Fig 5: Size of Arrival Cohorts, by Citizenship 
 
Alongside the difference in the number of people arriving in Australia in each year, 
the composition of new arrivals across cohorts was less stable for the New Zealanders 
than the UK migrants. These differences are most obvious in the birthplace 
composition of new arrivals (Figure 6). 
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Fig 6: Birthplace of New Arrivals, by Citizenship and Entry Cohort 
 
  15 
The proportion of NZ citizen arrivals who were not born in New Zealand rose 
dramatically in 2000/01 and fell again in 2001/02. This growth was particularly 
noticeable among those born in Asia, who accounted for 10.3 percent of NZ citizen 
arrivals in 1999/00, 18.1 percent in 2000/01 and 5.6 percent in 2001/02.   
As well as details of their current travel itineraries and personal characteristics 
such as date of birth and nationality, all travellers are asked to state their usual 
occupation.  While basic details such as date of birth can be cross-referenced to visa 
and passport details, and response rates for items such as main reason for overseas 
travel and state of (intended) residence in Australia are generally high, the question 
on usual occupation is frequently left blank. The high incidence of unrecorded 
occupation in the data set creates a substantial difficulty for research on both the 
determinants and the implications of migration. Occupation may be considered as a 
proxy for skill and, hence, for an individual’s ability to contribute productively to the 
economy of their country of residence, as well as giving an indication of personal 
characteristics such as income and employment-related mobility.  
However, this problem is significantly alleviated in the current dataset by the 
availability of multiple records for each individual. While only 32 percent of all 
observations (border crossings) include a stated occupation, 97 percent of the 
individuals in the sample provided an answer to this question at least once over the 
course of their trips into and out of Australia. While individuals may hold a number of 
jobs over their lifetimes, it seems reasonable to assume that the skill sets involved in 
these jobs are likely to be similar, especially over the relatively short period of three 
to six years covered by the current dataset. 
Therefore, in order to capture the greatest possible information set, a variable 
main occupation is defined as being the modal stated occupation over each 
individual’s observations. In cases where the modal occupation is not unique, the 
higher skilled occupation is chosen as the main occupation. This definition is justified 
where the focus is on skill levels, with the assumption that a person who usually 
works in a skilled occupation does not lose the associated skill set if they choose to 
take time out of the workforce, or are temporarily working in a different field.  
A second variable, skill level, is then defined as a proxy for the skill level of 
this occupation. The allocation of occupations into skill classes follows the definitions 
used by Glass and Choy (2001) and Shevland (1999). Glass and Choy (2001) refer to 
the three skill categories as high-skill, semi-skill and low-skill, and allocate 
occupations to these categories according to their one-digit New Zealand Standard 
Classification of Occupations (NZSCO). As the Australian Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ASCO) system is very similar to the NZSCO, the same allocations are 
used for this study. Table 1 shows the allocation of occupations to skill classes.  
 
Table 1: Occupations and Skill Categories 
Skill Category  ANZSCO Classification 
High-skilled Managers and Administrators 
 Professionals 
 Associate Professionals 
Semi-skilled  Tradespersons and Related Workers 
 Intermediate and Advanced Clerical, Sales and Service Workers 
 Intermediate Production and Transport Workers 
Low-skilled Elementary Clerical Sales and Service Workers 
 Labourers and Related Workers 
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For people outside the labour force, the unemployed, and those whose responses to 
the occupation question cannot be classified into a skill category (for example, those 
who stated their occupation as ‘self employed’), the skill variable is left blank. 
The variable main occupation is complete in 98 percent of all observations, compared 
with a response rate of only 32 percent for the basic occupation variable. In the case 
of the skill variable, skill level, is available for 71 percent of observations, while the 
original skill variable was observed for only 21 percent.  
Comparing across cohorts and source countries shows differences in both 
labour force status and skill levels. Overall, a lower proportion of NZ citizen arrivals 
were in the labour force (see Figure 7). This is largely due to the different age 
structure of the two migrant groups, with UK citizens being more strongly 
concentrated in the working age range of 20 to 64. In turn, this is due mainly to age 
restrictions for both permanent and long-term temporary visas which are required for 
UK citizens but not for New Zealanders. Controlling for age, UK and NZ labour force 
participation rates are more similar (Figure 7). 
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Fig 7: Labour Force Status of New Arrivals, by Citizenship and Entry Cohort 
 
The middle cohort of New Zealanders shows a lower probability of being in the 
labour force than either the pre- or post-policy cohorts. While the UK migrants show a 
similar pattern across cohorts, it is less pronounced than that of the NZ migrants. 
Figure 7 shows the labour force participation rates of the three migrant cohorts from 
each country, comparing the full sample with those aged 20 to 64, to control for the 
different demographic structure across the two source countries. 
UK migrants are also more likely to be employed in highly skilled occupations 
(Figure 8). Cohort differences in occupational skill are smaller, with the only notable 
difference being a slightly higher proportion of highly skilled individuals in the 
second and third cohorts of New Zealand citizens. These proportions are not affected 
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by considering only those of working age, as the skill definitions exclude non-labour 
force participants. 
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Fig 8: Skill Distribution of New Arrivals, by Citizenship and Entry Cohort 
 
As noted earlier, a smaller dataset was designed for the multivariate analysis of the 
next section. This dataset covers 3,473 NZ and 1,111 UK citizens.7 The distribution 
according to time of arrival and a comparison with the large sample cohorts is shown 
in Table 2. The small samples for each cohort are structurally very similar to the large 
samples for the corresponding cohort. Comparisons are given of the fraction of time 
spent in Australia for those who do not re-migrate, the percentage male, the 
percentage aged less than 30, and the percentage in professional and managerial jobs. 
Finally, it is useful to explicitly motivate the choice of the selected small 
sample of UK migrants are a good control group for the NZ migrants in the pseudo-
experimental setting resulting from the policy change. The analysis of the next section 
uses the standard difference in differences approach, which assumes that in the 
absence of the policy change, any difference in average behaviour between the 
‘treatment group’ (the New Zealanders) and the ‘control group’ (the UK migrants) 
would have remained the same. In addition, no other ‘shock’ may have affected the 
post policy change NZ migrants at the same time. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For a sensitivity analysis, the two cohorts were extended to four months of first arrivals, effectively 
doubling the sample sizes. Estimated coefficients and statistical significance remained generally very 
similar. 
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Table 2: Size of Arrival Sub-Samples, by Citizenship and Migration Intention 
 
(a) Number of employed persons of working age 
 First cohort – 
small sample 
First cohort – 
large sample 
Second cohort – 
small sample 
Second cohort – 
large sample 
NZ Settlers 2,197 14,421 1,276 8,263 
UK Settlers 550 4,141 561 4,432 
 
(b) Persons not re-migrating: fraction of time spent in Australia 
 First cohort – 
small sample 
First cohort – 
large sample 
Second cohort – 
small sample 
Second cohort – 
large sample 
NZ Settlers 0.964 0.964 0.957 0.959 
UK Settlers 0.965 0.964 0.969 0.963 
 
(c) Percentage male 
 First cohort – 
small sample 
First cohort – 
large sample 
Second cohort – 
small sample 
Second cohort – 
large sample 
NZ Settlers 59.9 57.9 55.4 53.7 
UK Settlers 60.7 62.6 64.2 62.6 
 
(d) Percentage aged less than 30 
 First cohort – 
small sample 
First cohort – 
large sample 
Second cohort – 
small sample 
Second cohort – 
large sample 
NZ Settlers 36.0 36.0 37.8 36.9 
UK Settlers 27.5 28.8 20.9 21.4 
 
(e) Percentage managers, administrators and professionals 
 First cohort – 
small sample 
First cohort – 
large sample 
Second cohort – 
small sample 
Second cohort – 
large sample 
NZ Settlers 46.7 47.0 51.6 53.2 
UK Settlers 62.7 59.6 62.8 64.3 
 
These assumptions are plausible for a number of reasons. The most important is that 
the time difference between recruitment of the cohorts (12 months) is small compared 
with subsequent period of observation (four years). Because relevant macro variables 
had similar levels at the time of recruitment of the samples (June/July 2000 and 
June/July 2001), differences in behavioural responses do not affect sample selection.8 
In addition, coincident changes that may affect the NZ migrants only (such as 
subsequent changes in Aus-NZ tax differential and exchange rates) would affect both 
NZ cohorts almost identically. Of course, the UK group, who are on average 
somewhat older and higher skilled, may have responded during the subsequent four 
years somewhat differently to changing macro conditions, but to control for this we 
will calculate the treatment effect after accounting for such composition effects, both 
parametrically and non-parametrically. As the next section will show, the policy 
change impact remains significant after accounting for the composition effects. 
 
 
5. Models of remigration, attachment and travel 
 
While the differences across cohorts of New Zealand migrants suggest that there may 
indeed have been an effect from the policy change on the magnitude and composition 
of migration from New Zealand to Australia, the main focus of this paper is on 
                                                 
8 Andrew Leigh kindly provided us with the relevant macro trends over the observation period. 
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changes in subsequent mobility patterns. The theoretical model outlined in Section 3 
suggests that the increased risk associated with living in Australia without the safety 
net of publicly provided unemployment insurance lowers expected income and 
increases the likelihood that New Zealand citizens choose to return home or to move 
on. Similarly, they may choose to make greater efforts to maintain connections with 
New Zealand, in order to benefit more from the ties they still have. 
Secondary mobility is discussed first with respect to first arrival in Australia, 
looking at the length of time for which Australia remains the main residential location. 
Multivariate duration analysis is used to examine the effect of personal characteristics 
and the change in social welfare eligibility on the probability of remigration among 
New Zealand citizens. A competing risks model is then used to determine the 
destination of New Zealand citizen departures – looking at whether those migrants 
who left Australia were returning to New Zealand, or travelling on to a secondary 
destination. Finally, the degree of attachment which migrants have to Australia is 
examined through statistical modelling of the proportion of time that new migrants 
spend in Australia, and the number of overseas trips they make. 
The concept of migration, as developed in Section 3, is defined in terms of a 
long-term change in residential location, associated with a change in the location of 
employment. According to their own stated intentions on arrival, all the migrants in 
the sample arrived in Australia planning to stay for a year or more. This is a 
significant period of time, and while a small number of these people may have come 
to Australia with sufficient funds to spend a year travelling, most would have been 
expecting to find work in Australia or to be supported by working family members. 
As such, the initial arrival of these people in Australia falls into the category of 
migration. 
Due to the fluidity of moves into and out of Australia it is not possible to state 
when a person has ‘permanently departed’. Remigration is therefore defined as a spell 
of at least six months out of the country, broken by no more than one short re-entry 
(defined as spanning no more than one month). This prevents some of the people who 
spend most of their time outside Australia, but return for regular short trips, from 
being counted as resident in Australia. Using this definition of remigration, 46.7 
percent of all migrants in our sample were counted as still being resident in Australia 
at the end of June 2005. The corresponding figures were 67.2 and 67.0 percent for NZ 
and UK permanent settlers respectively, 47.8 percent for NZ long-term visitors, and 
22.4 percent for UK visitors. Hence even among those migrants who intended to settle 
permanently, one third remigrated within four years. 
Using the sub-sample described in the previous section, we now turn to an 
examination of the impact of personal characteristics and the social welfare policy 
change on the probability of remigration from Australia. This is done through the use 
of duration/survival analysis. We focus on the hazard rate, which is here the 
conditional probability of remigration at time t, given that remained resident of 
Australia up to time t.  
Table 3 presents the results of a Cox Proportional Hazard model of the 
duration of time before remigration among permanent settlers. The Cox model is 
based on the assumption that there is an underlying probability of departure at any 
given duration t, )(0 tλ , which is scaled proportionately according to a vector of 
explanatory variables, x , representing individual characteristics and environmental 
changes, with unknown coefficients, β , which have a multiplicative effect on the 
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baseline hazard function. The overall hazard function ),,,( 0λβλ xt  therefore 
simplifies to )(),( 0 tx λβφ with the factor φ  commonly specified as φ β β( , ) exp( ' )x x= . 
Both sub samples are observed over the same duration since arrival, namely 48 
months.9 As the baseline hazard is estimated at a zero value of the covariates, the age 
variable is normalised so that the baseline hazard is estimated for migrants in the 20-
25 year age group. Robust standard errors are reported throughout.  
 
Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates 
 NZ Permanent Settler  UK Permanent Settler 
Variable Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Semi-skilled 0.027  0.064 -0.250 ** 0.117 
Low-skilled 0.012  0.095 -0.495  0.361 
Age -0.074 *** 0.009 0.003  0.022 
Age squared/100 0.165 *** 0.027 0.020  0.060 
Non-native -0.331 *** 0.079 0.596 *** 0.154 
Female 0.014  0.060 0.117  0.109 
Eastern State 0.094  0.096 -0.144  0.191 
Cohort 0.182 *** 0.059 -0.212 ** 0.104 
n 3471   1110   
Number of Failures 1152   359   
Log-likelihood -9108.44   -2447.35   
χ2(8) 148.30   29.94   
Significance levels:   * : 10%    ** : 5%   *** : 1% 
 
After controlling for compositional effects, the results show a significant difference in 
the duration of stay in Australia of ‘settler’ NZ migrants who arrived before and after 
the policy change. Individuals who arrived in the later cohort are estimated to have a 
higher probability of departure at any given time than an identical migrant from the 
earlier cohort. The difference is equal to exp(0.182)-1, i.e. 20 percent. In contrast, the 
probability of departure among UK permanent settlers was lower for the later cohort. 
If it is assumed that, absent the change in welfare policy, NZ migrants would have 
experienced a similar change in hazard rates over time as the UK migrants, a 
comparison of the difference between the two coefficients gives an estimate of the 
total effect due to the policy change. In this case, the difference-in-differences 
estimator is exp(0.182-(-0.212))=1.48, and statistically significant at the one percent 
level. That is, the policy change appears to have increased the instantaneous 
probability of departure among NZ settlers by almost 50 percent.10 
                                                 
9 Those people who arrived in the June/July 2001 sub-cohort are observed over a period of four years. 
In order to preserve consistency across the two sub-cohorts, it is therefore necessary to use a 48 month 
observation period for all the multivariate analysis. 
10 Alternative models were also estimated which allowed for possible interaction between the change in 
social welfare policy and the personal characteristics of the migrants, including occupational skill level 
and birthplace. Among UK migrants, neither of these interaction factors was significant. Among New 
Zealand citizens, the cohort effect was found to be significantly weaker for the semi-skilled migrants 
than for those in either low-skilled or high-skilled occupations. Birthplace did not significantly interact 
with the cohort effect. The stronger cohort effect for the low-skilled vis-à-vis semi-skilled may reflect a 
higher probability of unemployment among the former, and hence a greater relevance of the policy 
change. The higher departure probability for the later cohort of highly skilled migrants vis-à-vis semi-
skilled migrants may reflect relatively buoyant economic conditions in New Zealand in recent years. 
Difference in differences estimates based on group means are given in Table 7. 
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Other factors which show up as important determinants of the probability of 
remigration include age, which for New Zealanders has a non-monotonic relationship 
with the conditional probability of departure, with the lowest hazard rates being 
among those people in their thirties, the years when many people are starting families.  
Being a non-native (i.e., a migrant from New Zeeland or the UK who was not born in 
these two countries respectively) is also an important explanatory factor, but has 
different effects for NZ and UK Citizens. Among UK settlers, the relationship 
between birthplace and remigration propensity follows the expected pattern – those 
people who have already made at least one international move are more likely to 
remigrate from Australia. In contrast, non-native born New Zealand citizens show a 
lower propensity for remigration. This adds some support to the Australian contention 
that some migrants use New Zealand as a ‘back-door’ entry point for migration to 
Australia – taking advantage of New Zealand’s less restrictive migration policies to 
gain first permanent residence, then citizenship, with the attending right to live and 
work in Australia. Having reached Australia they then settle down and do not leave 
again.11 
As the sample used for the model reported in Table 3 is constructed only of 
those who initially stated an intention to remain permanently in Australia, all those 
who departed experienced a change of mind over the intervening period. As noted in 
Section 3, this may occur either due to an unexpected change in external 
circumstances or a change in the information set available to migrants. Figure 9 plots 
the estimated baseline hazard functions for the two groups of migrants.  
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Fig 9: Estimated Baseline Hazard Functions, Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
 
The non-monotonic shape of these functions, with a more pronounced peak for the 
UK migrants, suggests that information effects may indeed play an important role in 
the remigration decision. Both NZ and UK migrants have a relatively high probability 
of remigration in the early months after arrival. This probability is stronger among 
UK migrants, who presumably have less pre-migration information about their new 
                                                 
11 Supplementary regressions showed that the lower departure probability among non-NZ born was 
particularly significant among those born in the Pacific Islands, but that the difference between Asia-
born and New Zealand-born was not significant. These are two groups who were of particular concern 
to the Australian government as potential ‘back-door’ migrants. However, neither group showed 
significant differences in remigration propensity before and after the policy change. 
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host country, due to the greater distance between source and host countries. Over time, 
the probability of migration falls, as remaining migrants build up productive 
locational capital and personal relationships in Australia.12 
From the source country perspective, the question of how long emigrants remain in 
Australia is perhaps of secondary importance to the question of whether those who 
depart return to their country of origin or move on to an alternative destination. Table 
4 reports the results of a competing risks proportional hazard model, examining the 
differences among three groups of New Zealand settlers: those who remain in 
Australia; those who return to New Zealand; and those who move on to other 
countries. 
 
Table 4: Competing Risks Analysis 
 NZ Permanent Settler 
Variable Coef.  Std. Err. 
Semi-skilled -0.019  0.091
Low-skilled -0.062  0.148
Age -0.056 *** 0.013
Age Squared/100 0.106 ** 0.041
Non-native -0.585 *** 0.125
Female 0.142 * 0.086
Eastern State 0.213  0.142
Cohort 0.546 *** 0.085
Onward -0.997 * 0.524
Semi-skilled*onward -0.557 ** 0.265
Low-skilled*onward -1.190 ** 0.545
Age*onward -0.109 *** 0.037
Age squared/100*onward 0.272 ** 0.117
Non-native*onward 1.214 *** 0.282
Female*onward -0.371  0.249
Eastern State*onward -0.426  0.369
Cohort*onward 0.085  0.243
n (1846 persons x 2 destinations) 3692   
Number of Remigrants 636   
Log-pseudolikelihood -4811.81   
χ2(15) 387.45   
 
Identifying the destination of departing migrants is somewhat complicated as only 
those migrants who state that they are ‘residents of Australia departing permanently’ 
are asked to give a country of next permanent residence (CNPR). 13  As many 
departures in the sample class themselves as ‘visitors’ in Australia (despite their 
                                                 
12 One commonly recognised difficulty with the estimation of duration of stay models is the potential 
for duration dependence or ‘cumulative inertia’ to be confused with the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. Individual heterogeneity can, in principle, be included in duration modelling, through 
the use of frailty models. However, as the Cox model does not place any restrictions on the shape of the 
underlying hazard function, estimation with individual heterogeneity is not practicable, due to the high 
degrees of freedom lost relative to the number of observations. Frailty models were estimated using a 
parametric model with log-logistic baseline hazard functions. This model produced qualitatively similar 
estimates for the effect of covariates, and suggested that some, but not all, of the observed duration 
dependence was due to unobserved heterogeneity. Overall, however, the Cox model provided a better 
fit to the data. 
 
13 Australian resident departing temporarily, which can be for 12 months or more, are asked to simply 
specify the country in which they will spend most time abroad.  
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earlier assertion that they intended to settle permanently), this means that response 
rates for the question on CNPR are very low. However, by combining migrant 
responses to CNPR with their response to ‘country of disembarkation from this flight’ 
it is possible to get a reasonably good response rate for the destination of NZ migrants. 
Due to their relative geographic positions, it seems reasonable to assume that 
travellers departing from Australia and disembarking in New Zealand will have New 
Zealand as their main destination. This analysis cannot be performed for UK migrants, 
as the recorded country of disembarkation for migrants travelling to the northern 
hemisphere will generally be a stopover or transit point, rather than an intended 
destination. 
Departing migrants who gave neither an intended country of next permanent 
residence nor a country of disembarkation are excluded from the analysis. In order to 
redress the balance between stayers (who are overrepresented in the remaining sample, 
due to the exclusion of those who departed without giving an intended destination) 
and remigrants, a random selection of just under half of the stayers were also excluded 
from the sample. This is justifiable under the assumption that there were no 
systematic differences between those who did and those who did not state an intended 
destination on departure from Australia. The resulting sample consists of 1,846 
permanent settlers, of whom 1,210 remained resident in Australia throughout the four 
year observation period, 558 returned to New Zealand, and 78 left Australia for a third 
destination.  
The formulation of the model shown in Table 5 assumes that individual 
characteristics will impact differently on the conditional probability of return than on 
the conditional probability of an onward move, but restricts the underlying shape of 
the baseline hazard function to be the same for both types of departure. An additional 
variable, type, is added to capture the different base probability of an onward move, 
relative to a return move. ‘Onward’ is a binary variable equal to zero for return moves 
and one for onward moves. As such, the coefficient of -0.997 associated with the 
onward variable suggests that for the average migrant, the probability of an onward 
move is around exp(-0.997)=37 percent of the probability of a return to New Zealand.  
The basic coefficients relate to the probability of return migration, while the 
coefficients on the interaction terms show how the probability of departure differs 
from the base when the event in question is onward migration, rather than return. The 
coefficient of 0.546 on the cohort variable suggests that those migrants who arrived in 
the June/July 2001 cohort have a probability of departure at any given duration of stay 
exp(0.546)=1.72 times that of those from the earlier cohort. The lack of significance 
of the interaction between cohort and type suggests that being in the latter cohort does 
not have a differential effect on the probability of an onward move, relative to a return. 
Where interaction terms are significant, the relative probability of an onward 
move associated with the characteristic in question can be calculated by adding the 
exponentiated coefficient on the basic variable to that of the interacted variable. For 
example, the probability of return among the non-native born is only exp(-0.585) = 
0.56 times that of the NZ born, while the relative probability of an onward move is 
exp(-0.585+1.214)=1.88.  That is, the non-NZ born have an 88 percent higher 
probability of departing for a secondary destination, and a probability of returning to 
New Zealand 43 percent lower than that of the NZ born.  This suggests that the non-
NZ born have weaker attachment to New Zealand, perhaps due to continuing 
attachment to their country of birth. Alternatively, they may also have a greater 
preference for travel and new residential locations. 
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Skill also came out as an important determinant of the destination of remigration, with 
higher skill levels being associated with a greater probability of onward migration. 
Skilled migrants are likely to be more internationally mobile due to both a more 
globalised labour market in skilled occupations, better skills for gathering and 
processing information about opportunities in other locations, and less restrictive 
immigration barriers to entering other countries than unskilled workers. Age had a 
non-monotonic relationship with both onward and return migration, while females 
showed a slightly higher probability of re-migration than males. However, there is no 
evidence for a gender difference in the choice between onward and return migration. 
Alongside the questions surrounding actual duration of stay, the dataset also 
provides valuable information about the ongoing mobility patterns of new migrants to 
Australia. Among those migrants who were not observed to remigrate from Australia, 
99 percent spent over three quarters of their time onshore. Table 5 reports OLS 
estimates of the determinants of attachment of those migrants who remained resident 
in Australia. The results show that skill levels are important in determining the 
proportion of time which new migrants spend onshore, with lower skill levels being 
associated with higher attachment to Australia. Cohort effects are again important for 
the NZ settlers, but not for the UK citizens, and suggest that the change in social 
welfare policy indeed had the anticipated effect of reducing observed attachment to 
Australia. 
 
Table 5: OLS Regression of Attachment Rate, Australian Residents Only 
 NZ Permanent Settler  UK Permanent Settler 
Variable Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Semi-skilled 0.015 *** 0.003 0.014 *** 0.004
Low-skilled 0.018 *** 0.004 0.020 * 0.011
Age 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001  0.001
Age squared/100 -0.004 *** 0.000 -0.005 * 0.002
Non-native 0.004  0.003 -0.006  0.008
Female -0.003  0.002 -0.001  0.004
Eastern State -0.009 ** 0.004 -0.006  0.004
Cohort -0.006 ** 0.003 0.003  0.004
Intercept 0.955 *** 0.005 0.952 ∗∗∗ 0.009
n 2320   751   
R2 0.03   0.03   
F(8,2320/1103) 8.86   3.30   
 
Table 6 turns the focus to the extent of international travel among those who remain 
resident in Australia. The table reports negative binomial regression models of the 
number of international trips away. Clearly, travel frequencies are closely interrelated 
with overall attachment levels – those people who choose to spend more time abroad 
will naturally be expected to make more overseas trips. In order to control for the 
proportion of time that migrants choose to spend abroad, while reducing the problem 
of endogeneity associated with the relationship between attachment to Australia and 
the travel frequency, the dependent variable in the model is the number of exits made 
over the last three years of observation, while attachment to Australia in the first year 
after arrival is used as an instrument for the overall degree of attachment. Attachment 
to Australia is found to have a strong and significant negative relationship to 
international mobility in the following periods. 
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Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression for Number of Trips Away in Years 2-4, 
Australian Residents 
 NZ Permanent Settler  UK Permanent Settler 
Variable Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Semi-skilled -0.465 *** 0.050 -0.662 *** 0.102
Low-skilled -0.607 *** 0.067 -0.775 ** 0.303
Age -0.001  0.007 -0.007  0.019
Age Squared/100 -0.002  0.020 0.048  0.054
Non-native -0.344 *** 0.049 -0.001  0.173
Female 0.018  0.042 0.127  0.096
Eastern State 0.333 *** 0.069 0.494 *** 0.102
Attachment in first year -3.865 *** 0.227 -3.434 *** 0.453
Cohort 0.228 *** 0.043 0.154 * 0.092
Intercept 4.353 *** 0.288 3.200 *** 0.480
Alpha 0.557 *** 0.029 0.759 *** 0.081
n 2320   751   
Log pseudolikelihood -4681.67   -1194.64   
χ2(9) 502.90   164.76   
Significance levels:   * : 10%    ** : 5%   *** : 1% 
 
After controlling for the total proportion of time spent out of the country, the cohort 
effect is highly significant for NZ citizens but less for UK citizens (and only 
significant at the 10 percent level), with those New Zealanders who arrived after the 
policy change being relatively more likely to travel internationally. In summary, we 
find that NZ settlers who arrived after the policy change and stayed for at least four 
years have nonetheless a greater incentive to maintain connections with their home 
countries (New Zealand or elsewhere) through travel there (Table 6), to have less 
attachment to Australia (Table 5) and a greater probability of eventual return (Table 3). 
 It is of course possible to argue that there is heterogeneity in the samples in 
that the cohort effect interacts with subgroup characteristics. Difference in differences 
estimates have therefore also been calculated at the sample means for narrowly 
defined subgroups (with reasonable sample sizes). The results are reported in Table 7, 
which disaggregates into age, gender and skill groups. For all groups, the change in 
social security eligibility increased the likelihood of remigration from Australia, 
lowered the mean proportion of time in Australia among residents, and increased the 
mean number of trips away (except for the latter in the case older low skilled 
migrants).  
Distance and travel costs also appear to play an important role in determining travel 
frequency. This is implied by the comparison of travel frequency between NZ and UK 
citizens, and between native born and non-native born New Zealanders. Using the 
intercept terms to compare basic travel frequency shows that New Zealanders tend to 
make more trips on average than their UK counterparts. This reflects the greater 
expense involved in travelling ‘home’ when the source country is more distant. At the 
same time, non-native born New Zealanders show lower travel frequency than the 
native born, as the non-native born are more inclined to travel to more distant 
destinations rather than back to New Zealand. 
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Table 7: Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of the Social Security 
Policy Change on Mobility for Specific Sub-Groups 
 (a) Young, low-skilled, both sexes 
 Probability of 
remaining in Australia 
Mean Proportion of 
time in Australia 
Mean number of 
trips away 
Sample Size 
 NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settler
s 
Early 
Cohort 71.74 82.5 0.777 0.861 1.49 0.89 1097 80 
Late 
Cohort 68.14 85.11 0.743 0.869 1.67 1.01 408 94 
∆ -3.6 2.61 -0.034 0.008 0.18 0.12   
∆ - ∆ -6.21 -0.042 0.06  
 
(b) Older, low-skilled, both sexes 
 Probability of 
remaining in Australia 
Mean Proportion of 
time in Australia 
Mean number of 
trips away 
Sample Size 
 NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settler
s 
Early 
Cohort 82.44 76.81 0.849 0.841 1.87 0.8 837 69 
Late 
Cohort 74.08 76.06 0.781 0.843 2.01 1.08 355 71 
∆ -8.36 -0.75 -0.068 0.002 0.14 0.28   
∆ - ∆ -7.61 -0.07 -0.14  
 
(c) Younger, highly-skilled males 
 Probability of 
remaining in Australia 
Mean Proportion of 
time in Australia 
Mean number of 
trips away 
Sample Size 
 NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settler
s 
Early 
Cohort 70.93 67.74 0.779 0.741 3.15 1.79 1758 840 
Late 
Cohort 68.16 75.53 0.751 0.795 3.57 1.92 1126 850 
∆ -2.77 7.79 -0.028 0.054 0.42 0.13   
∆ - ∆ -10.56 -0.082 0.29   
 
(d) Younger, highly skilled females 
 Probability of 
remaining in Australia 
Mean Proportion of 
time in Australia 
Mean number of 
trips away 
Sample Size 
 NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settler
s 
Early 
Cohort 69.66 64.86 0.77 0.715 3.07 1.77 1539 629 
Late 
Cohort 69.31 70.17 0.76 0.756 3.54 1.79 1111 637 
∆ -0.35 5.31 -0.01 0.041 0.47 0.02   
∆ - ∆ -5.66 -0.051 0.45   
 
 
 
  27 
Table 7 continued 
 (e) Older, highly skilled males 
 Probability of 
remaining in Australia 
Mean Proportion of 
time in Australia 
Mean number of 
trips away 
Sample Size 
 NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settler
s 
Early 
Cohort 77.33 61.99 0.805 0.673 2.81 2.29 2131 613 
Late 
Cohort 75.3 65.44 0.781 0.721 3.99 2.44 1162 871 
∆ -2.03 3.45 -0.024 0.048 1.18 0.15   
∆ - ∆ -5.48 -0.072 1.03   
 
(f) Older, highly skilled females 
 Probability of 
remaining in Australia 
Mean Proportion of 
time in Australia 
Mean number of 
trips away 
Sample Size 
 NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settlers 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settlers 
NZ 
Settler
s 
UK 
Settler
s 
Early 
Cohort 80.53 61.4 0.836 0.681 2.39 1.62 1356 386 
Late 
Cohort 75.38 69.72 0.789 0.765 2.89 1.64 995 492 
∆ -5.15 8.32 -0.047 0.084 0.5 0.02   
∆ - ∆ -13.47 -0.131 0.48   
 
In contrast, there is no significant difference in the travel frequency of UK citizens 
according to birthplace.  While the distance between home and host countries is 
generally greater for the UK citizens, the non-native born do not systematically live in 
more distant locations than the native born, as is the case for New Zealand. 
The positive relationship between skill levels and travel frequency is strong 
and consistent across the migrant groups.14 Those in skilled occupations are likely to 
have higher disposable incomes, and hence greater opportunities to travel overseas for 
personal reasons, as well as a higher likelihood of work-related international travel. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we focused on the international mobility of New Zealand migrants to 
Australia. This topic is of interest for public policy in both countries, given that the 
number of New Zealand citizens residing in Australia has increased markedly in 
recent decades and given that more than one out of ten New Zealanders now lives 
across the Tasman Sea. Unique longitudinal information on arrivals and departures by 
individuals permitted an assessment of the likelihood of remigration of New Zealand 
migrants from Australia, their attachment to that country, and their international travel. 
To assess the impact of the removal of eligibility to labour market-related social 
security in Australia to visa-free trans-Tasman migrants, United Kingdom migrants 
acted as a control group. 
                                                 
14 This relationship is also strong and consistent among temporary migrants, though the results are not 
shown in this paper. 
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We found that of New Zealand migrants who came to Australia to settle permanently, 
one third remigrated within four years, but this proportion is almost the same for those 
from the United Kingdom. However, the impact of the policy changes on the hazard 
rate of the mobility process is quite high: the difference-in-differences estimator 
suggested a 50 percent increase on the baseline hazard rate of remigration among New 
Zealanders. No difference was detected in the impact on onward and return moves, 
but settlers arriving after the policy changes had lower attachment to Australia and 
made more trips away. This is equally true for migrants born in New Zealand as for 
‘back-door’ migrant from elsewhere who arrived in Australia after obtaining 
citizenship in New Zealand. 
 The present analysis can be extended in various ways. The most obvious is 
that it would be helpful to extend the data to a longitudinal sample of a decade or 
longer. This would permit the more conventional definition of remigration, i.e. a spell 
away of twelve months or more. With the longer observation period, it would also be 
possible to take account of place (home and host country) rather than just person 
characteristics. As noted earlier, the omission of the former is justified in the present 
analysis by the observation that over the short time span considered relative economic 
conditions in the UK, Australia and New Zealand did not change much. 
 Another extension is to contrast migrants’ intension as stated on their arrival 
and departure cards with actual outcomes. The analysis of causes of prolonging or 
curtailment of trips is only appropriate for long-term visitors rather than permanent 
settlers and has not been considered here (but see Sanderson 2006).  
 A further extension that becomes possible with data on longer time-spans is to 
consider how travel and attachment affect subsequent remigration decisions. For 
example, one could ask if an increased frequency of trips home would be simply an 
income elastic response to successful settlement, or an investment that might pay off 
in subsequent return migration.  
 It is clear that the arrival and departure cards, combined with visa information, 
provide very limited information on migrant characteristics. Further in-depth analysis 
of migrant behaviour would certainly benefit from an in-depth survey of randomly 
selected new settlers, ideally followed up by subsequent interviews to maintain the 
information longitudinally. 
 Finally, some recent research using New Zealand international movement data 
suggests that remigration of new settlers in New Zealand is much higher than the 
propensity of New Zealanders to emigrate (Shorland, 2006). A comparison and 
analysis of international mobility patterns of the native born and migrants in both 
Australia and New Zealand also remains a potentially fruitful avenue for further 
research. 
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